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Translog normalised restricted profit function model is specified and estimated for 
the four rice granary areas, each administered by a local government body, namely, the 
MIP, the KIP, the NWSP, and the KEIP, in which the price-support programme has some 
noticeable effects on farm tenancy and farms profitability. So far, there have been no 
empirical studies that have used this methodological framework to analyse such 
economic phenomenon in Malaysia. This, in fact, is the main contribution of the present 
paper. From the estimated function, the shadow values of land and labour are computed, 
which in turn are used to elucidate the behaviour of rice farmers in Malaysia. Together, 
the estimated and computed results, to a large extent, are successful in explaining the 
observed changes in farm tenancy patterns and the way the farmers (comprised of owner-
operator, owner-tenant, and tenant-farmer) are “economically” responding to the sum of 
profits generated from rice farming and, subsequently, from the programme. Further, 
given the price-support programme, the results also point to the fact that rice farming in 
Malaysia is as lucrative a job as any other sub-sector outside this, in particular unskilled 
urban workers and electronics workers, and thus this programme could be pursued 
further. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The price-support programme for Malaysian paddy farmers was first 
introduced in 1980. There were two major reasons for the government to implement 
the price-support programme: (i) to encourage a greater marketable surplus [Tan 
(1987)] and (ii) to augment the farmers’ income so that the incidence of poverty 
among them might be reduced [Tamim (1994)]. When it was first introduced in 
1980, the price-support rate was set at RM (Ringgit Malaysia, the Malaysian 
currency) 33.00 per ton of paddy sold to the National Rice Board or private rice 
millers or wholesalers. However, due to some grievances expressed by the farmers, 
the government decided to increase the rate to RM165.00 per ton in the same year.  
In 1990, it was further increased to RM247.50 per ton. 
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The price-support programme had some noticeable impacts on the farmers’ 
average income. In 1984, four years after its inception, it was estimated that 69 
percent, or RM1228.00, of the farmers’ average net income of RM1780 was due to 
price subsidy (price-support programme and other factor-input subsidies) from the 
Government. If the average yield per hectare is 3 tons [Malaysia (1986, p. 106)] and 
the price-support rate is RM165.00, the price-support per hectare being RM495.00, it 
accounts for about 40 percent of the total price subsidy; if the rate is RM247.50, it 
accounts for 60 percent of the price subsidy. 
In Malaysia, there are three types of farmers, namely, owner-operator, owner-
tenant, and tenant-farmer. The tenant-farmers cultivate only the farmlands they rent 
in; the owner-operators cultivate only the farmlands they own; and owner-tenants 
cultivate both the lands they own and rent in. The tenant-farmers do not have legal 
rights to the farmlands on which they work.  By paying a fixed rental, they have a 
limited right to cultivate the land within a stipulated period as agreed upon with the 
owner-operators or owner-tenants. 
As in the case of American agriculture [Gardner and Pope (1978)], the price-
support programme affected the behaviour of Malaysian rice farmers. As shown by 
Tamim (1988), the farmers who directly benefited from the programme showed 
inclination towards enlarging their farm size, and the enlarged farm area accounted 
for 65 percent of the growth in output. A similar trend was also shown by Fujimoto 
(1991). Such structural transformation influences the farm tenancy patterns 
significantly.  As  shown  in  Table 1,  all  but  one  farming area experienced a sharp  
 
Table 1 
Farm Tenancy Patterns and Growth Rate of  Major Malaysian 
Farming Areas, Selected Years 
(Unit %) 
Farming Area*  KIP  KEIP  NWSP  MIP 
Year  1984 1990 1980 1988 1985 1990 1980 1990 
Farm Tenancy          
Owner-operator  55.0 41.5 66.0 43.5 72.3 81.0 54.0 29.3 
Owner-tenant  27.0 26.7 15.0 28.7  8.8  4.7 18.0 37.8 
Tenant-farmer  18.0 31.8 19.0 27.8 18.9 14.3 28.0 32.9 
Annual Average Compound Rates of Growth** 
Farming Area  KIP  KEIP  NWSP  MIP 
Farm Tenancy      
Owner-operator  –4.58 –5.07  2.30 –5.93 
Owner-tenant –0.03  8.45  –11.79  7.70 
Tenant-farmer 9.95  4.87  –5.43  1.63 
Note: * KIP = Kemubu Irrigation Project.       KEIP = Kerian Irrigation Project. 
         NWSP = North-West Selangor Project.   MIP =  Muda Irrigation Project. 
       ** Figures in the bottom half of Table 1 show the annual average compound rates of growth of each 
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decline in the percentage of owner-operators over the 1980–90 period. For example, 
in the case of the Kerian Irrigation Project (KEIP), the percentage of owner-operators 
decreased from 66.0 percent in 1980 to 43.5 percent in 1988.
1 The changes in the 
percentage of owner-tenants were mixed, but the percentage of tenant-farmers 
increased sharply in contrast to the owner-operators, the only exception being the 
North-West Selangor Project (NWSP). 
The above discussion shows that there was a noticeable change in the farm 
tenancy pattern of Malaysian rice farming in response to the implementation of the 
price-support programme.The purpose of the present paper is to investigate the 
relationship between the price-support programme and the structure of Malaysian rice 
farming.  In particular, we focus our analysis on two questions. First, was it the change 
in tenancy patterns due to the changes in incomes of the respective farmer groups? For 
example, in the case of NWSP, was it the change due to higher incomes received by 
the owner-operators by virtue of the price-support programme which induced them to 
repossess the farmlands they previously rented out to owner-tenants or tenant-farmers? 
Or, in other farming areas, was it due to stable output price which induced the tenant-
farmers to rent in more farmlands? So far, there have been no empirical studies to 
address this question, and we wish to establish a link between the price-support 
programme and the changes in tenancy patterns in Malaysian rice farming. 
The second question concerns farm profitability in Malaysia. As mentioned 
above, the price subsidy amounted to 69 percent  of the farmers’ net income, of 
which 40–60 percent is due to the price-support programme. Still, how profitable 
is Malaysian rice farming?  In order to answer this question, we need to take into 
account not only the farmers’ annual net income but also the changes in output and 
input prices and zakat, the tax levied on Muslim farmers whose yield exceeds the 
635 kgs tax-exempt quantity (nisab).
2 By incorporating the price and cost changes 
 
1Due to lack of data, Table 1 shows data for only two observation years.  Also the initial and 
terminal years are different for different farming areas. 
2Haughton (1986, p. 218) does not make a distinction between zakat levied on farmers in the 
main- and off-season, and states that the amount of tax-exempt quantity of zakat is about 615kgs.   
Fujimoto (1980, p.179) does not take the seasonal factor into consideration either, and reports the amount 
of tax-exempt quantity of zakat to be about 577kgs.  Kuchiba et al. (1979, p. 119), on the other hand, state 
that the amount of tax-exempt quantity of zakat is about 552kgs.  The official figure, however, is 653 kgs 
and the tax is levied at the rate of 10 percent and 5 percent on Muslim farmers’ total rice production of the 
main- and off-season, respectively. Approximately 97 percent of Malaysian rice farmers are Muslims.  
Zakat is incorporated into the model in the following manner.  In the computation of the restricted profit, 
zakat has been deducted from the sum of market price and price-support of rice.  This gives rise to the 
definition of net unit price.  Then, multiplying the net unit price by output minus the sum of the variable 
inputs cost (i.e., intermediate inputs and machinery) we obtain the restricted profit. Mathematically, it can 
be shown as follows:  





where ∏ is the restricted profit, PY is the price of output, PSU is the price-support, ZAKAT is the zakat, Y is 
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into the computation of farm profits, we shall be able to better understand how 
farm tenancy groups react to the changes in their incomes. To our knowledge, 
there are no past studies to have quantitatively investigated the impact of the price-
support programme on farm profitability in Malaysia. We expect that the findings 
from this study would be useful to policy-makers to formulate policies related to, 
for instance, labour movements between the rice farming sector and the 
urban/industrial sectors. 
The framework that we use to address these questions is that of normalised 
restricted profit function.  This framework is chosen because it allows us to directly 
estimate the shadow values of land and labour, which in turn allows us to compute 
the shadow rental rate of land and the average profit per hectare.  These estimates 
permit us to measure the impact of the price-support programme on farm tenancy 
patterns and farm profitability. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe the methodology, and 
in Section 3 we present the results of empirical analysis and the findings of the study. 
Finally, in Section 4, there is a summary and the conclusion. 
 
2.  MODEL SPECIFICATION 
 
The Normalised Restricted Profit Function Model 
In analysing the Malaysian rice production we assume that the production 
function is given by 
 
Y = F(X,Z) 
    = F(Xl , ……., Xm;  Z1, ….... Zn)  … … … …  (1) 
 
where Y is rice output, and X and Z are the vector of variable and fixed inputs,             
respectively. In this analysis, we take land and labour to be fixed inputs. We note in 
passing that, except for urban wage rates, an explicit labour market does not exist in 
Malaysian rice sector. By introducing a profit function with labour as a quasi-fixed 
input, however, enables us to compute the shadow value of labour. 
Using the duality theory as proposed by Lau (1976), a normalised restricted 
profit function can be derived as 
∏ = ∏ ( W1, ……., Wm ; Z1, ……, Zn)   …  …  …    (2) 
where ∏ is the restricted profit and W is the vector of variable-input prices. Both Π  
and  W  are normalised (i.e., divided) by the price of output, PY. The normalised 
restricted profit is the maximum profit given the levels of fixed inputs and the 
variable-input prices. That is, 
∏ (W, Z ) = F(X 
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where * indicates the quantities of X which maximise the normalised profit, given Z. 
By applying Hotelling’s lemma to (2), the variable-input demand functions are 
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*
i  (W, Z)     …  …  …  ….  …  (4)  
 
where i denotes machinery (M) and intermediate inputs (U). If (2) is differentiated 
with respect to (w.r.t.) the quantity of fixed inputs, i.e., land and labour, then the 
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j (W, Z)     …  …  …  …  …  (5) 
where j denotes land (B) and labour (L), and P
s
j is the shadow value of the jth fixed 
factor input. 
Following Sidhu and Baanante (1981)
3, we approximate (2) by a translog 
normalised restricted profit function as 
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By differentiating the left-hand-side of (6) and applying Hotelling’s lemma, we 







i j W   X
= – Si  , i = M, U  … … … …  (7) 
Equating this with the derivative of the right-hand-side of (6) w.r.t. lnWi yields 








δij  lnZj ,        i = M,U   …  …  (8) 
Using (3) and (7), the output supply share in the total profit can be obtained as 
 
3Antle (1984) remarks on Sidhu and Baanante’s typographical error in Equation (2) where a 
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where Sy denotes the output supply share in the total profit. 
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ϕjk lnZk),     j = B, L …  … (10) 
Note that due to the assumed fixity of two inputs (land and labour), all elasticities in 
this model are of short-term nature. They correspond to a period of time, which is 
sufficiently long for farmers to adjust the levels of output and variable inputs but too 
short for them to adjust the levels of fixed inputs. The estimates based on (10) are the 
shadow values of land and labour expressed in real terms. We multiply both sides of 
(10) by output price, PY, to express the shadow values in monetary terms. 
Before proceeding further, two remarks are in order. First, Equations (2), (3), (4), 
and (5) imply that the profits and the shadow values of land and labour can be measured 
as functions of prices of output and variable inputs and the quantities of fixed inputs. 
Second, the chances in farm tenancy patterns and farm profitability all 
depend upon changes in the shadow values of land and labour and farm profits. 
Hence, any changes in these variables as a result of changes in the output price-
support programmes will have a direct effect on farm tenancy patterns and farm 
profitability.  In other words, the effects of output price-support programme can 
be captured by estimating its impacts on the shadow values of land and on 
profits. The latter can be done by differentiating the shadow values of land and 
labour and profits w.r.t. the output price, holding variable factor input prices 
constant. We can similarly measure the impact of intermediate-input price on the 
shadow values of land and labour and profits, by differentiating the shadow 
values and profits w.r.t. the intermediate-input price, holding output and other 
variable-input prices constant. 
These estimation procedures can be formally described as follows. First, the 
effect of output price-support programme on the shadow values of land and labour 
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Second, the effect of intermediate-input-price support programme on the shadow 
values of labour and land can be measured by log-differentiating Equation (10) w.r.t.              






























    j = B, L   …  …  (12)           
If the translog restricted normalised profit function (6) is estimated, all these 
effects can be measured from the empirical data. 
 
Empirical Application of the Model 
The system of three equations consisting of (6), (8), and (9) will be 
simultaneously fitted to the data sets from four Malaysian major rice farming areas, 
namely, the North-West Selangor Project (NWSP), the Muda Irrigation Project 
(MIP), the Kemubu Irrigation Project (KIP), and the Kerian Irrigation Project 
(KEIP), each with two growing seasons.  The data are the time series and cross-
section data, which are pooled over 11 years from 1980 to 1990. The parameter 
estimates of these equations will be used to estimate the shadow values of land and 
labour and to derive  estimates of the impacts of the price-support programme on the 
shadow values of land and labour and on profits. For efficiency reasons, all except 
supply share equations will be estimated jointly by Zellner’s (1962) iterative 
seemingly unrelated regressions (ISUR). That is, we drop the output supply equation 
from the estimation but later the coefficients will be computed using the parameter 
relationships of the linear homogeneity restrictions. The parameter estimates 
obtained from (6), (8), and  (9) will be used to investigate the effects on farm tenancy 
patterns and farm profitability. 
 
Farm Tenancy Patterns 
To measure the changes in farm tenancy patterns, it is essential to obtain the 
shadow value of land for each observation year. This is because the shadow rental 
rate of land (SRRB) is defined as the shadow value of land (P
S
B) divided by the 
market price per hectare of farmland (P
M





B   … … … … … …  (13) 
Equation (13) is used to measure the changes in farm tenancy patterns over the 1980–90 
period. The values obtained from the computation of SRRB will be compared with the 
commercial bank interest rates (CBIR).
4 A rational owner-operator will decide whether to 
continue working on farms or not according to SRRB > CBIR, or SRRB < CBIR. 
 
4Although, theoretically, the CBIR expressed in real terms should be taken for comparison with 
the SRRB, in the context of our study, the CBIR expressed in nominal terms is used.  The reason for 
taking the nominal terms is that the farmers’ attitude towards depositing their money in a bank seemed not 
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Farm Profitability 
The impact of price-support programme on farm profitability for the tenant-
farmers and owner-operators can be measured based on the average profit per hectare 
of planted paddy area (AVEPH). AVEPH is computed by dividing the restricted 
profits of each farming area and season (∏) by the planted paddy area (ZB). That is, 
AVEPH = ∏  / ZB    … … … … … …  (14a) 
where ∏  = 
S
B P ZB  +  
S
L P  ZL 
Equation (14a) can also be expressed as 
AVEPH = PB
S + PL
S (ZL/ ZB)  … … … … …  (14b) 
To evaluate how tenant-farmers (who maximise profits) adjust their sources of 
income based on (14), we define NORM1 as follows: 
NORM1 =  PL
S ZL





S  – PB
MR  + PL





L Z P = 
S
L P (ZL/ ZB) is the sum of shadow value of labour per hectare planted 
paddy area, and the denominator is the shadow value of land minus market rental 
rate of land plus the shadow value of labour, or tenant-farmers’ net profit. That is, 
NORM1 is the ratio of total shadow value of labour to net profit per hectare. If this 
value is smaller than unity, the tenant-farmers will continue working on farmlands. 
Otherwise, they will decide to give up farming and work either as wage-labourers on 
other farms or search for off-farm employment [Bardhan and Srinivasan (1971)]. 
Note that apart from NORM1, there are several other factors which may determine 
the occupational choice of the tenant-farmers like the level of education, the 
economic transformation that was taking place, etc. 
Next, we evaluate how owner-operators adjust their sources of income. A 
rational owner-operator will make a comparison between the shadow value per 
hectare of land or SHADOW (i.e., the expected income derived from self-
cultivation) and the actual income per hectare of land or ACTUAL (i.e., the expected 
income derived from renting-out farmlands). The ratio of the former to the latter will 
be defined as NORM2: 
NORM2  = SHADOW / ACTUAL = P
S
B / PB
MR    …  …  …  (16) 
A rational owner-operator will base his/her decision on NORM2.  Specifically, if 
NORM2 is greater than unity, he/she  will continue to work on the farmlands. 
Otherwise, he/she will decide to rent-out the farmlands. The money received is 
deposited in a bank on which he/she will receive interest in return. As in the case of 
tenant-farmers, he/she may also look for off-farm jobs. Effects of Price-support on Farm Tenancy and Profitability  59
Although Equations (15) and (16) are defined for tenant-farmers and owner-
operators, they are applicable also to owner-tenants. Since owner-tenants possess as 
well as rent-in farmlands, they have three options: (i) if NORM2 is smaller than 
unity, they will rent out the farmlands; (ii) if NORM1 is less than unity, they will 
continue to work on their rented-in farmlands; and (iii) if NORM2 is greater than 
unity and NORM1 is less than unity (i.e., if the self-cultivated and rented-in 




The data used for the present analysis were compiled from the published 
statistics and reports of four farming area development authorities, namely, the 
North-West Selangor Project (NWSP), the Muda Irrigation Project (MIP), the 
Kemubu Irrigation Project (KIP), and the Kerian Irrigation Project (KEIP). The data 
were collected for two growing seasons, namely, the main- and off-seasons. The 
initial and terminal years for each farming area are 1980 and 1990. Since we have 4 
farming areas, each with 2 seasons, the total number of observations is 88. The 
variables required to estimate the translog restricted normalised profit function are 
the prices of output and variable factor inputs, (machinery and intermediate inputs), 
the profit share of each variable input, and the quantities of fixed factor inputs (land 
and labour). We processed the data compiled for each farming area and season 
according to the specification of the model.  In computing the variables, we followed 
the Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982) procedure. A detailed explanation on 
how the variables were generated is given in Appendix 1. 
 
3.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
The results of parameter estimates for the translog normalised restricted profit 
function are presented in Table 2. The adjusted R
2 for the profit function and the 
expenditure-share equations for machinery and intermediate inputs were 0.92, 0.35, 
and 0.28, respectively. The regularity conditions such as monotonicity and convexity 
were checked and found to be satisfied at the approximation point.
5 Thus, we can say 
that the estimated functions are well-behaved. 
Using the parameter estimates of Table 2 and Equation (10), the shadow 
values of land and labour were computed for each farming area.  Furthermore, using 
the same parameter estimates and Equations (11), (12), (13), (14), (15) and (16), the 
impacts of output price-support programme on the shadow values of land and labour, 
and on profits, farm tenancy patterns, and farm profitability of different tenure 
arrangements were computed. 
 
5Monotonicity requires that the predicted output share is positive and input shares are negative.             
Convexity requires that the profit function is convex in prices.  That is, its Hessian matrix must have non-
negative diagonal elements. Naziruddin Abdullah  60
Table 2 
Parameter Estimates of the Translog Restricted Normalised Profit Function for 
Malaysian Rice Farming, 1980–90 
Parameter Estimate  t-value 
α  0.119 5.725 
αM  –0.247 –21.321 
αU  –0.441 –29.034 
αY  1.688 73.701 
βL  0.517 43.469 
βB  0.495 28.249 
γMM  1.132 2.677 
γUU  1.381 4.106 
γMU  –1.025 –2.808 
γYY  0.464 2.629 
γYM  –0.107 –0.726 
γYU  –0.357 –2.727 
ϕLL  0.179 4.709 
ϕBB  0.288 7.801 
ϕLB  –0.198 –5.911 
δML  0.219 4.559 
δMB  –0.301 –6.749 
δUL  –0.296 –6.536 
δUB  –0.229 –5.438 
δYL  –0.516 –9.363 
δYB  0.531 10.281 
Note: The coefficients for output supply function (Y) were obtained using the parameter-restrictions of 
linear homogeneity. In addition, while subscripts M and U denote machinery and intermediate 
inputs, B and L denote land and labour, respectively. All of them were treated in the model as 
independent variables. 
Estimation Equation  Adj-R
2 
Restricted Profit Function  0.92 
Machinery Share Equation  0.35 
Intermediate Inputs Equation  0.28 
Labour Equation  0.27 
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Shadow Value of Land 
The estimates of shadow value of land (P
S
B) for the NWSP, MIP, KIP, and 
KEIP are presented in Table 3 along with the corresponding market rental rates of land 
(PB
MR), for the main-season (MS) and off-season (OS). As evident from the table, the 
shadow value and the market rental rates of land were not commensurate over the 
1980–90 period. Specifically, (i) irrespective of seasons and with a few exceptional 
years, the market rental rates in the NWSP and the MIP areas were in general higher 
than the shadow values of land; and (ii) irrespective of seasons, the shadow values of 
land in the KIP and the KEIP areas were higher than the market rental rates. 
Since there have been no previous estimates of shadow values of land for the 
NWSP and the MIP, our results cannot be compared with findings of other studies.  
However, the results for the KEIP and the KIP can be compared with those of Ismail 
(1972) and Horii (1972).  While Ismail reports a similar finding to ours for the KIP, 
that is, the shadow value was higher than the market rental rate of land, Horii finds 
that there exists a considerable variation between the shadow value and market rental 
rate for the KEIP. From our and Ismail’s findings, we can conclude that in the KIP 
farming area, the tendency for the shadow value to exceed the market rental rate 
seems to persist even after the implementation of the price-support programme. As 
can be seen from Table 3, the values of P
S
B in all farming areas and seasons show an 
increasing trend. However, with the exception of the period 1980-82-3, the values of 
P
S
B in the KIP and the KEIP are higher than those in the NWSP and the MIP, 
implying that land has been more intensively used in the former farming areas. The 
reason for the difference in the shadow value of land between the two groups of 
farming areas will be examined further when we discuss the shadow value of labour 
below. 
 
Shadow Value of Labour 
Table 4 shows the estimates of shadow value of labour (P
S
B), the 
corresponding urban wage rates of the unskilled (P
U
B) and electronics (P
E
L) workers, 
and their respective ratios for the 1980–90 period. In all farming areas, the shadow 
value shows an increasing trend. Note that, with the exception of 1989–90, the 
shadow value of labour in the NWSP and the MIP is lower than the wage rates of 
unskilled (and/or electronics) labour. However, in the KIP and the KEIP, starting 
from 1985-86, the shadow value of labour (P
S
L) is equal to or greater than the 
unskilled wage rates (P
U
L), though the former is still lower than the electronic wage 
rates (P
E
L) in most of the years. 
The discrepancies in the shadow value of labour between the NWSP/MIP as 
one group and the KEIP/KIP as another can be better explained if the levels of 
technology and the shadow value of land are taken into account.  First, on average, 
90 percent of the  NWSP/MIP areas were mechanically  ploughed as compared to 45Naziruddin Abdullah  62
Table 3 
Shadow Value of Land (PB
S) and Market Rental Rate of Land (PB
MR) for all Farming Areas, Main- and Off-season 














1980  361 340 429 507 376 287 403 141 
1981  378 414 451 561 381 289 419 199 
1982  405 590 459 604 418 292 410 252 
1983  437 558 432 628 383 295 440 184 
1984  419 576 387 635 429 285 418 216 
1985  427 479 406 660 458 282 456 225 
1986  456 535 418 655 497 288 485 216 
1987  450 497 417 659 507 293 505 218 
1988  479 495 440 404 545 297 528 225 
1989  484 450 461 330 548 300 528 221 
1990  448 524 407 307 506 300 503 211 














1980  372 434 431 460 361 289 398 158 
1981  367 434 442 528 398 291 411 221 
1982  398 496 469 599 398 294 391 231 
1983  422 563 412 592 441 297 418 212 
1984  416 563 369 607 417 289 420 223 
1985  415 580 393 608 468 287 460 242 
1986  484 484 421 648 492 293 491 214 
1987  456 481 389 610 512 296 506 218 
1988  474 447 425 356 539 299 528 210 
1989  455 473 452 338 539 300 534 218 
1990  453 513 410 307 490 301 521 199 
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                                                                                                     Table 4 
Shadow Value of Labour (PL
S), Wage Rates of Unskilled (PL
U) and Electronics (PL




























1980  1.03 1.16 0.40 2.60  2.92 0.44 2.34  2.64 0.40 2.60  2.92 0.41 2.52  2.84 
1981  1.08 1.19 0.51 2.11  2.33 0.60 1.78  1.98 0.50 2.17  2.39 0.53 2.03  2.24 
1982  1.14 1.22 0.62 1.84  1.97 0.71 1.61  1.72 0.62 1.85  1.98 0.62 1.83  1.96 
1983  1.19 1.26 0.75 1.60  1.69 0.63 1.89  1.99 0.61 1.96  2.07 0.75 1.60  1.69 
1984  1.25 1.29 1.09 1.14  1.18 0.96 1.31  1.35 1.11 1.13  1.16 1.09 1.14  1.18 
1985  1.30 1.33 1.12 1.16  1.19 1.04 1.25  1.28 1.25 1.04  1.07 1.32 0.98  1.01 
1986  1.34 1.37 1.25 1.07  1.10 1.09 1.23  1.26 1.47 0.91  0.93 1.47 0.91  0.93 
1987  1.37 1.52 1.18 1.16  1.28 1.06 1.29  1.43 1.57 0.86  0.97 1.60 0.86  0.95 
1988  1.42 1.67 1.3 1.10  1.29 1.13 1.25  1.47 1.70 0.85  0.99 1.68 0.85  1.00 
1989  1.46 2.08 1.46 1.00  1.43 1.38 1.06  1.51 1.98 0.74  1.05 1.82 0.80  1.14 
1990  1.51 2.40 1.59 0.95  1.51 1.56 0.97  1.54 2.26 0.66  1.06 2.28 0.66  1.05 
























1980  1.03 1.16 0.42 2.46  2.76 0.44 2.35  2.64 0.37 2.82  3.17  0.4 2.54  2.86 
1981  1.08 1.19 0.48 2.26  2.49 0.59 1.85  2.04 0.52 2.10  2.31 0.52 2.07  2.28 
1982  1.14 1.22 0.59 1.93  2.07 0.75 1.53  1.64 0.56 2.03  2.18  0.6 1.91  2.05 
1983  1.19 1.26 0.72 1.65  1.75 0.56 2.12  2.25 0.72 1.65  1.75 0.71 1.67  1.77 
1984  1.25 1.29 1.07 1.17  1.21 0.83 1.52  1.56 1.04 1.19  1.23 1.10 1.14  1.17 
1985  1.30 1.33 1.03 1.26  1.29 0.95 1.36  1.39 1.30 1.00  1.02 1.34 0.97  1.00 
1986  1.34 1.37 1.42 0.95  0.97 1.09 1.22  1.25 1.46 0.92  0.94 1.49 0.90  0.92 
1987  1.37 1.52 1.23 1.11  1.23 0.87 1.58  1.75 1.62 0.83  0.94 1.60 0.86  0.95 
1988  1.42 1.67 1.29 1.10  1.30 1.04 1.37  1.61 1.75 0.78  0.95 1.66 0.85  1.00 
1989  1.46 2.08 1.25 1.17  1.66 1.31 1.17  1.59 1.94 0.73  1.08 1.85 0.79  1.12 
1990  1.51 2.40 1.66 0.91  1.45 1.57 0.96  1.53 2.16 0.70  1.11 2.37 0.64  1.01 
Note: All figures in Tables 3 and 4 are expressed in Ringgit Malaysia (RM).  NWSP, MIP, KIP and KEIP are the farming areas as defined in the textNaziruddin Abdullah  64
percent in the KIP and 15 percent in the KEIP.  Second, on average, 90 percent of 
the MIP and 35 percent of the NWSP planted areas were mechanically harvested as 
compared to 21  percent and 13  percent in the KIP and the KEIP, respectively. This 
implies that, so far as rice farming technology is concerned, the NWSP/MIP adopted 
a relatively machinery-intensive technology while the KEIP/KIP adopted a relatively 
labour-intensive technology. Given the differences in the levels of technology, the 
shadow values of land and labour will naturally be different.  When machinery-
intensive technology is adopted, the land will be increasingly demanded [Gardner 
and Pope (1978); Herdt and Cochrane (1966); Kuroda (1992) and Said (1985)].  In 
the case of Malaysian rice farming, Said specifically points out that the growth of 
“large farms has been facilitated by mechanisation of land preparation and harvesting 
process” [Said (1985), p. ii].  An increase in the demand for land will theoretically 
lead to a higher rental rate. 
From these above observations, the following chain of effects should likely 
occur: different levels of technology adoption lead to different levels of demand for 
land and labour, which result in different levels of land rental rates and wage rates 
and consequently bring about different trends and magnitudes of the shadow values 
of land and labour. This chain of effects seems to have occurred in the two rice- 
farming groups in Malaysia. In the KEIP/KIP farming areas (especially, in the later 
half of the observation years), because the technology adopted was relatively labour-
intensive, there were more demands for labour than for machinery. Thus, farmers in 
the KEIP/KIP attached a higher weight to labour than machinery, which resulted in a 
higher shadow value of labour.  The opposite was true in the NWSP/MIP areas. We 
conclude, therefore, that the discrepancies in the shadow values of land and labour 
between the two farming groups are explainable by referring to the differences in the 
levels of technology adoption.  
 
Farm Tenancy Patterns 
How does the price-support programme effect the farm tenancy patterns? 
Since the farmers are assumed to make a decision as to whether or not to 
continue working on farmlands based on the SRRB > CBIR or SRRB < CBIR, 
the impact can be explained as follows. From the estimated result of Equation 
(13), presented in Figures 1 and 2, we see that the SRRB > CBIR in NWSP. 
Hence, the owner-operators should have repossessed the farmlands which they 
had previously rented-out to other farmers. As a consequence, some of the 
owner-tenants should have given up some or all of their previously rented-in 
farmlands and instead concentrated on working on their own lands. Some tenant-
farmers might have been left with two options, namely, either to become full-
time  farm  labourers  or  to migrate to the urban sector. On the other hand, in the  Effects of Price-support on Farm Tenancy and Profitability  65
 
 
Figure 1 & 2 
 
 
Farm Tenancy Patterns: Decision Made Based on SRRB and CBIR 
(Main- and Off-season) 
Note:  NWSP = North-West Selangor Project.  MIP = Muda Irrigation Project. 
  KIP = Kemubu Irrigation Project.  KEIP = Kerian Irrigation Project. 
  IRRB = Imputed Rental Rate of Land.  CBIR = Commercial Bank Interest Rate. 









































































































































                 Fig. 1.  Main-season.  
Fig. 2.  Off-season.  Naziruddin Abdullah  66
case of the MIP, we observe from Figures 1 and 2 that the SRRB > CBIR, which 
is opposite from the outcome for the NWSP.  Thus, some of the owner-operators 
should have rented-out their farmlands to owner-tenants and tenant-farmers, and 
as such the percentage share of the latter tenancies should have increased 
significantly.  Meanwhile, in the case of the KIP and the KEIP, the trend is not 
so obvious.  Hence, it seems that the empirical results of comparing the SRRB 
with the CBIR for the NWSP and the MIP are consistent with the changes in the 




As can be seen from Table 5, the NORM1 of the NWSP (main-season) is in 
most  cases  greater  than  unity.  In  addition,  four out  of eleven of its off-season  
 
Table 5 
Farm Profitability Criteria of Tenant-farmers, NORM1 
Main-season NWSP(MS)  MIP(MS)  KIP(MS)  KEIP(MS) 
Year   
1980 –10.76  1.65  0.40  0.32 
1981 3.19  13.85  0.44  0.52 
1982 –1.49  19.24  0.81  0.63 
1983 –1.93  –1.59  0.85  0.69 
1984 1.14  0.62  0.54  0.48 
1985 1.06  0.83  0.53  0.69 
1986 1.31  0.79  0.88  0.76 
1987 1.01  0.65  0.95  0.80 
1988 1.17  0.51  1.49  1.05 
1989 0.88  0.55  0.08  1.01 
1990 0.51  0.36  0.61  1.03 
Off-season NWSP(OS)  MIP(OS)  KIP(OS)  KEIP(OS) 
Year   
1980 2.73  0.30  0.32  0.39 
1981 1.64  0.58  0.28  0.36 
1982 0.72  2.74  0.24  0.52 
1983 –1.74  1.80  0.61  0.41 
1984 0.84  0.47  0.37  0.39 
1985 0.64  0.39  0.41  0.53 
1986 1.01  0.56  0.83  0.55 
1997 0.70  0.79  0.63  0.63 
1988 0.62  0.41  0.63  0.84 
1989 0.47  0.43  0.63  0.90 
1990 0.45  0.34  0.52  0.80 Effects of Price-support on Farm Tenancy and Profitability  67
NORM1 are greater than unity.
6 Because the tenant-farmers normally rented-in the 
farmlands for a period of one year (i.e., two seasons), the farm profitability of one 
season might possibly effect the other. That is to say, on the whole, due to 
insufficient profit, which they earned from farming, some of the tenant-farmers must 
have decided to quit farming.  Consequently, they must have adjusted their sources 
of income by either taking up farm jobs or moving out of the rice-farming areas to 
take up off-farm jobs. Presumably reflecting this fact, the tenant-farmers’ share in the 
NWSP dropped by 3.6 percent over the period (Table 1). 
Now, except for a few observation years, the NORM1 of the MIP, the KIP, 
and the KEIP is smaller than unity. This means that the tenant-farmers do not have 
reasons to adjust their sources of income other than from farming.  In fact, due to 
sufficient profit which they earned from farming, some must have acquired or 
rented-in more farmlands. This has resulted in an increase in their farm tenancy share 




The calculated results of NORM2 presented in Table 6 suggest the following: 
(i) except for a few observation years, NORM2 and the NWSP and the MIP are 
smaller than unity, suggesting that the owner-operators were adjusting their sources 
of income from farm profits to renting-out farmlands and/or income from off-farm 
employment. This implies that their farm tenancy share would have decreased over 
the period.  However, this result does not seem to be consistent with the data shown 
in Table 1.
7 In particular, with NORM2 being smaller than unity, some owner-
operators in the NWSP would have rented-out their farmlands. However, in reality, 
their tenancy share increased by 8.7 percent. This discrepancy needs further 
clarification. One possible explanation is as follows. We showed earlier that the 
tenant-farmers in the NWSP were, on average, making insufficient profits to 
continue working on farming. Under such circumstances, some of them are left with 
no option but to quit farming.  In other words, they must have returned the rented-
in farmlands  to the owner-operators and looked for off-farm jobs. The opposite of 
this phenomenon is that, although it may be unprofitable, as indicated by the 
NORM2  figures,  some  of  the  owner-operators  might  have  been  “obliged”          
to  repossess   the  previously  rented-out  farmlands. The  combination  of  these  
 
6In particular, in 1983 (off-season) and in 1980, 1982, and 1983 (main-season) the NORM1 is 
negative, implying that the tenant-farmers, on average, made negative profit.  This is because the AVEPH 
they received was smaller than the rental rate of land that they paid for that year. 
7In the MIP farming area, instead of owner-operators, the owner-tenants mainly benefited from 
the value of NORM2, which were smaller than unity.  In this case, the NORM1 (i.e., less than unity) 
criterion was used as the basis to maximise their farm profits.  This is shown in Table 1 by the percentage 
change of about 20 percent in owner-tenants’ share during the period under study. Naziruddin Abdullah  68
Table 6 



















1980  1.06 0.84 1.31 2.85 
1981  0.91 0.81 1.32 2.11 
1982  0.69 0.76 1.43 1.63 
1983  0.78 0.69 1.30 2.39 
1984  0.73 0.61 1.50 1.93 
1985  0.89 0.62 1.62 2.03 
1986  0.85 0.64 1.73 2.22 
1987  0.91 0.63 1.73 2.32 
1988  0.97 1.09 1.83 2.35 
1989  1.07 1.40 1.83 2.40 
1990  0.86 1.32 1.69 2.38 














1980  0.86 0.94 1.25 2.52 
1981  0.85 0.84 1.37 1.86 
1982  0.80 0.78 1.35 1.69 
1983  0.75 0.70 1.49 1.97 
1984  0.74 0.60 1.44 1.88 
1995  0.72 0.65 1.63 1.90 
1986  1.00 0.65 1.68 2.29 
1987  0.95 0.64 1.73 2.33 
1988  1.06 1.19 1.80 2.51 
1989  0.96 1.34 1.80 2.44 
1990  0.88 1.33 1.63 2.63 
 
two forces would have resulted in an increase in the owner-operator share in the 
NWSP farming area from 72.3 percent in 1985 to 81.0 percent in 1990; (ii) with the 
exception of a few observation years, NORM2 of the KIP and the KEIP are greater 
than unity, implying that the owner-operators are expected to repossess the 
previously rented-out farmlands. In other words, some of them must not only have 
relied on the present self-cultivated farmlands but also repossessed more lands to 
increase their income. However, contrary to our expectation, the share of owner-
operators in both the KIP and the KEIP decreased by 13.5 percent and 22.5 percent, 
respectively.  
Further elaboration of this interesting finding seems to be necessary. From the 
discussion of the farm profitability of the KEIP and KIP’s tenant-farmers (NORM1) Effects of Price-support on Farm Tenancy and Profitability  69
and owner-operators (NORM2), it is obvious that: (i) both tenancy groups made 
sufficient profits out of farming; and (ii) while the percentage share of the owner-
operators has decreased, that of the tenant-farmers has increased over the period of 
study. 
          Given the scope of the present study, this peculiar trend (which is inconsistent 
with the figures shown in Table 1) is difficult to ascertain and, thus, left for future 
scrutiny. Nevertheless, one possible explanation is that some of the owner-operators 
are willingly giving up more of their farmlands to be rented-out by the tenant-
farmers. In return, the owner-operators received a higher rental rate of land. This 
makes sense if one refers to Table 5 where the (P
MR
B) of the KEIP and the KIP is 
increasing over time. 
 
4.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
         In this paper we used a translog normalised restricted profit function approach 
to measure the impacts of price-support programme on farm tenancy patterns and 
farm profitability in Malaysian rice farming. The main findings are as follows.  
  1. The effects of the price-support programme on shadow value of land show 
two distinctive patterns. While in the NWSP and the MIP farming areas the 
market rental rate of land was found to be larger than the shadow value, in 
the KEIP and the KIP farming areas the opposite pattern was observed. 
  2. The shadow value of labour of all farming areas showed an increasing trend. 
However, with the exception of 1989-90, in the NWSP and the MIP the 
shadow value of labour was lower than the wages of unskilled and 
electronics workers. In the KIP and the KEIP, starting from 1985-86, the 
shadow value of labour was greater than the unskilled wage rate, but still 
lower than the electronics wage rates (in most of the years). 
  3. In the MIP the shadow rental rate of land was smaller than the commercial 
bank interest rate, while the opposite was true in the NWSP.  This implies 
that some owner-operators in the MIP would have quit working on 
farmlands, whereas those in the NWSP would have repossessed the 
farmlands which they previously rented-out. These results are consistent with 
the data shown in Table 1. In the case of the KIP and the KEIP, the trend was 
not so obvious. 
  4. As a result of the price-support programme, the number of owner-operators 
in the NWSP who cultivated the farmlands themselves increased. This was 
the case even though the expected income from self-cultivation was smaller 
than the expected income from renting-out farmlands. The reason was that 
many tenant-farmers in the NWSP were facing the problem of insufficient 
net profits. Thus, it was not worthwhile for the farmers to continue working 
on the farmlands which they rented-in, and, hence, the owner-operators were Naziruddin Abdullah  70
“obliged” to repossess the farmlands which they had previously rented-out.  
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i i U M i X W from the gross revenue (PY). The output price (i.e., 
including price-support) is the price index for total rice.  The base year for this and 
the following indexes was set at 1984. What follows is the list of rice market price, 
price-support rate, and the ratio of the latter to the former for the entire period under 
survey. 
Season/Year  Rice Market Price  Price-support Rate/ton  Ratio (%)  
I/1980 RM449.00  RM33.00 0.73 
II/1980 RM448.80  RM165.00 36.76 
I/1981 RM450.00  RM165.00  36.67 
II/1981 RM451.50  RM165.00 36.54 
I/1982 RM449.00  RM165.00  36.75 
II/1982 RM467.80  RM165.00 35.30 
I/1983 RM467.80  RM165.00  35.30 
II/1983 RM468.10  RM165.00 35.25 
I/1984 RM466.10  RM165.00  35.40 
II/1984 RM469.40  RM165.00 35.15 
I/1985 RM469.30  RM165.00  36.16 
II/1985 RM469.20  RM165.00 36.17 
I/1986 RM467.20  RM165.00  35.32 
II/1986 RM473.00  RM165.00 34.88 
I/1987 RM463.30  RM165.00  35.61 
II/1987 RM465.40  RM165.00 35.45 
I/1988 RM465.30  RM165.00  35.46 
II/1988 RM465.30  RM165.00 35.46 
I/1989 RM466.90  RM165.00  35.34 
II/1989 RM475.40  RM165.00 34.71 
I/1990 RM475.80  RM247.50  52.02 
II/1990 RM476.00  RM247.50 52.00 
Source:  MADA (1990). 
Note: I and II imply the off- and main-season planting, respectively. Effects of Price-support on Farm Tenancy and Profitability  71
The cost of machinery input (WM  XM) was defined as the sum of the 
expenditures on machinery.  The procedure employed to compute the price index for 
this input is as follows.  First, the costs of ploughing and harvesting were multiplied 
by the number of mechanised ploughed and harvested areas, respectively. Second, 
adding these two costs gave rise to the definition of total machinery costs. Finally, 
the price index of machinery was obtained by aggregating the price indexes of 
ploughing and harvesting. 
The cost of intermediate-input (WU  XU) was defined as the sum of the 
expenditures on fertilisers, seeds, agri-chemicals, and irrigation costs.  The price 
index was obtained aggregating the price indexes of the respective inputs. 
The quantity of labour (ZL) was defined as the total man-hours of family and 
hired-workers. The quantity of land (ZB) was defined as the total of planted areas for 
paddy production of each farming area. 
All the variables were transformed into multilateral indexes using the Caves, 
Christensen and Diewert (1982) method. This method is an extension of the 
Tornqvist approximation method of the Divisia index to multilateral data and time-
series of cross-section data. 
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